国际法前沿：国际法的计量与计算

编译与整理：屈冠男 

本期目录

国际法的计算分析

成本收益分析：定义、理据和对会议文件的评论

作为私人产品的裁判

法律的私人执行

规则接受者还是规则制定者？非洲双边投资条约实践新探

投资仲裁裁决的正确性：为何错误裁决“不会消亡”

计算社会科学：障碍与机遇

如何衡量选区的紧凑性——一种实证计算方法

国际法的计算分析

【题目】The Computational Analysis ofInternational Law

【引用】Alschner, Wolfgang, TheComputational Analysis of International Law (July 29, 2019). Forthcoming inRossana Deplano and Nicholas Tsagourias (eds), 'Research Methods inInternational Law: A Handbook', Ottawa Faculty of Law Working Paper No.2019-33, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3428762

【摘要】

当传统的国际法技术达到其概念和方法的极限时，我们需要寻求其他学科的帮助。国际法学者过去曾从经济学、政治学或社会学中得到启示，以丰富我们对国际法的研究和理解。现在是时候在这个名单上增加一个新的学科了：计算机科学。国际法的计算分析使法律分析具有可扩展性，使国际律师能够以前所未有的深度和广度研究国际法。在这篇文章中，我概述了国际法的理论和法律制度研究的计算技术，强调了这一被忽视但日益重要的跨学科研究领域。

【原文】

When traditional international law techniques reach their conceptualand methodological limits, we need to look for help in other disciplines.International law scholars have in the past drawn inspirations from economics,political science or sociology to enrich the study and our understanding ofinternational law. Now the time has come to add a new discipline to this list:computer science. The computational analysis of international law renders legalanalysis scalable and empowers international lawyers to study international lawin unprecedented depth and breadth. In this contribution, I provide an overviewof computational techniques for the doctrinal and legal-institutional study ofinternational law highlighting this neglected, but increasingly important fieldof interdisciplinary study.

【关键词】International law, computerscience, data science, network analysis, natural language processing, machinelearning

成本收益分析：定义、理据和对会议论文的评论

【题目】Cost‐Benefit Analysis:Definition, Justification, and Comment on Conference Papers

【引用】Posner, Richard A."Cost‐Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification, and Comment onConference Papers." The Journal of Legal Studies 29, no.S2 (2000): 1153-177. Accessed July 17, 2021. doi:10.1086/468108.

【摘要】

在这篇对会议论文的评论中，波斯纳法官主张对成本收益分析进行实用性解释和辩护，并证明这种分析的好处；回应对这种分析办法的具体批评并提出修改建议；强调这种分析办法作为社会经济决策的评价工具的价值并不取决于相关哲学问题的解决。

【原文】

In this comment on the conference papers, Judge Posner argues for apragmatic construal and defense of cost-benefit analysis, demonstrating thebenefit of such analysis; responding to specific criticisms of, and suggestedchanges in, the analysis; and emphasizing that the value of such analysis as anevaluative and decision tool for social and economic policy making does notdepend on the resolution of philosophical problems.

作为私人产品的裁判

【题目】Adjudication as a Private Good

【引用】Landes, William M. and Posner,Richard A., Adjudication as a Private Good (July 1978). NBER Working Paper No.w0263, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=260455

【摘要】

本文探讨了裁判是否可以被视为一种私人物品，即能够在自由市场中产生最优水平的物品。第一部分侧重于私人法院，指出它们作为解决争端和制定规则机构的局限性，但也强调过去和现在私人法院以各种表现形式发挥的重要作用。第二部分讨论了最近的一篇文献，该文献认为，在诉讼当事人为私人或公司、法官造法的法律领域，公共法院系统所产生的规则是纯粹私人投入的有效产物。我们的分析表明，尽管可以确定哪些领域确实可以根据经济形势预测这种趋势，但这些文献夸大了普通法体系产生有效规则的趋势。作为对新兴的法律经济理论文献的贡献，我们发现公共法院不会自动生成有效的规则，这令人失望，因为这就无法解释这些规则产生的机制，就像英美法系许多领域中的法官造法那样。然而，我们的另一个主要发现，即管辖私人审判的实践和法律似乎受到经济因素的强烈影响，并且可以用经济术语加以解释，这证明经济理论在解释法律制度的基本特征方面可以发挥重要作用。

【原文】

This paper examines the question whether adjudication can be viewedas a private good, i.e., one whose optimal level will be generated in a freemarket. Part I focuses on private courts, noting their limitations asinstitutions for dispute resolution and rule creation but also stressing theimportant role that the private court, in its various manifestations, hasplayed both historically and today. Part II discusses a recent literature whichhas argued that the rules generated in the public court system, in areas of thelaw where the parties to litigation are private individuals or firms and therules of law are judge-made, are the efficient products of purely privateinputs. Our analysis suggests that this literature has overstated the tendencyof a common law system to produce efficient rules, although areas can beidentified where such a tendency can indeed be predicted on economic grounds.Viewed as a contribution to the emergent literature on the positive economictheory of law, our finding that the public courts do not automatically generateefficient rules is disappointing, since it leaves unexplained the mechanisms bywhich such rules emerge as they seem to have done in a number of the areas of Anglo-Americanjudge-made law. However, our other major finding, that the practices and lawgoverning private adjudication appear to be strongly influenced by economicconsiderations and explicable in economic terms, is evidence that economictheory has a major role to play in explaining fundamental features of the legalsystem.

法律的私人执行

【题目】The Private Enforcement of Law

【引用】Landes, William M. and Posner,Richard A., The Private Enforcement of Law (November 1974). NBER Working PaperNo. w0062, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=259376

【摘要】

执法经济研究中的一个重要问题是，公共执法者和私人执法者之间的责任划分是否恰当，是否切实可行。最近，Gary Becker和George Stigler在一篇文章中主张执法私人化，这一问题引起了人们的极大关注。本文我们探讨了这样一种观点，即基于效率的原因，私人执法事实上明显优于公共执法的领域比Becker和Stigler认为的更受限制；也许公共部门和私营部门之间现有的执法分工接近最佳分工。本文第一部分构建了一个竞争的，利润最大化的私人执法的经济模型。该模型预测了在完全的执法私人化情况下的执法水平和犯罪数量。第二部分对模型进行了改进，以说明私人执法行业中存在的垄断、法律索赔中不同的产权分配、对私人执法者征税的影响、非金钱处罚和法律错误——第一部分模型的初步构建忽视了这些因素。第三部分对比了我们的模型与其他经济方法关于执行问题研究的异同。第四部分介绍了该模型的一些积极意义，涉及刑法与民法的公共和私人执行之间的选择、犯罪受害人的专属权利的分配、公共机构的预算、自由裁量不执行法律以及勒索和贿赂的法律处理。尽管第四部分的研究结果是高度试探性的，但该模型的积极意义似乎与对现实世界的观察结果一致。附录讨论了奖励的经济学——一种补偿私人执法者的重要方法。

【原文】

An important question in the economic study of enforcement is theappropriate, and the actual, division of responsibilities between public andprivate enforcers. This question has been brought into sharp focus recently byan article in which Gary Becker and George Stigler advocate the privatizationof law enforcement. In the present article, we explore the idea that the areain which private enforcement is in fact clearly preferable to publicenforcement on efficiency grounds is more restricted than Becker and Stiglerbelieve; perhaps the existing division of enforcement between the public andprivate sectors approximates the optimal division. Part I develops an economicmodel of competitive, profit-maximizing private enforcement. The model predictsthe level of enforcement and the number of offenses that would occur in a worldof exclusively private enforcement. Part II refines the model to account forthe presence of monopoly in the private enforcement industry, differentassignments of property rights in legal claims, the effect of taxing privateenforcers, nonmonetary penalties, and legal errors - elements ignored in theinitial development of the model in Part I. Part III contrasts our model withother economic approaches to the enforcement question. Part IV presents anumber of positive implications of the model, relating to the choice betweenpublic and private enforcement of criminal versus civil laws, the assignment ofexclusive rights to the victims of offenses, the budgets of public agencies,the discretionary nonenforcement of the law, and the legal treatment ofblackmail and bribery. The positive implications of the model appear to beconsistent with observations of the real world, although the findings in PartIV must be regarded as highly tentative. An appendix discusses the economics ofrewards - an important method of compensating private enforcers.

规则接受者还是规则制定者？非洲双边投资条约实践新探

【题目】Rule-takers or Rule-makers? ANew Look at African Bilateral Investment Treaty Practice

【引用】W. Alschner; D. Skougarevskiy;"Rule-takers or Rule-makers? A New Look at African Bilateral InvestmentTreaty Practice" TDM 4 (2016), www.transnational-dispute-management.com

URL: www.transnational-dispute-management.com/article.asp?key=2357

【摘要】

谁是非洲BIT世界的规则接受者和规则制定者？利用文本相似度的计算方法，本文提供了一个细致入微的实证答案。首先，我们发现非洲国家往往是南北关系的规则接受者，但在南南双边投资条约的谈判中享有更大的话语空间。然而，只有少数非洲国家在非洲内部谈判中利用更大的发言权，将公共政策例外纳入双边投资条约。事实上，最近非洲商签的南北双边投资条约比其与非洲南部地区商签的双边投资条约有着更大的政策空间。第二，规则制定者和规则接受者也存在于非洲南部地区。然而，与南北关系相比，非洲南部地区的谈判结果似乎更多地取决于专家知识，而不是权力不对称。埃及等强国未能主导谈判，而小岛屿国家毛里求斯凭借其战略投资政策议程成功地确定了投资协定的条款。因此，本文对非洲条约格局提出了更为微妙的看法，指出了新的研究领域，并强调了技术专门知识在建立连贯一致的条约网络方面的重要性。

【原文】

Who are the rule-takers and rule-makers in the African BIT universe?Using computational measures of textual similarity this paper provides anuanced empirical answer to this question. First, we find that African statestend to be rule-takers in North-South relations, yet enjoy greater agency innegotiations of South-South BITs. Only few African countries, however, usetheir greater say in intra-African negotiations to include public policyexceptions in BITs. Indeed, recent North-South BITs contain more policy spacethan their Southern counterparts in Africa. Second, rule-makers and rule-takersalso exist within the African South-South BIT landscape. Yet, in contrast toNorth-South relations, negotiation outcomes seem to be shaped more by expertknowledge than by power asymmetries. Powerful states like Egypt fail todominate negotiations, while small-island-state Mauritius with its strategicinvestment policy agenda succeeds in setting the terms of investmentagreements. This paper thus provides a more nuanced view of the African treatylandscape, points to new areas of research and highlights the importance oftechnical expertise in achieving coherent treaty networks.

投资仲裁裁决的正确性：为何错误裁决“不会消亡”

【题目】Correctness of InvestmentAwards: Why Wrong Decisions Don’t Die

【引用】Alschner, W. (2020). Correctnessof Investment Awards: Why Wrong Decisions Don’t Die, The Law &Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, 18(3), 345-368.doi: https://doi.org/10.1163/15718034-12341408

【摘要】

仲裁裁决的正确性是当前改革投资者与国家争端解决机制（ISDS）多边努力的中心问题。除了保护争议双方免受仲裁庭的错误（既往正确性，retrospective correctness）之外，纠正性审查还指导未来的仲裁员不要重复过去的错误（预期正确性，prospective correctness）。本文评估了现有的三种ISDS纠正机制（1）撤销委员会或国内法院的审查，（2）缔约方的审查，以及（3）后续仲裁庭的审查在促进这种预期正确性方面的有效性。在评估现有实践后，本文发现错误的决定“不会消亡”。被撤销或无效的裁决被继续援引，缔约国的权威解释被忽视，随后的仲裁庭也没有围绕一个统一的判例展开论证。纠正机制未能实现预期的正确性是由于缺乏法律约束，即使有利的裁决已经无效，也鼓励使用这些裁决，以及很难判断裁决是否仍然代表ISDS中“正确”的法律。本文最后提出了可能的改革，即从裁决的验证（shepardization of awards），到援引先例的规则，再到更广泛的制度改革来提高裁决的预期正确性。

【原文】

Correctness of arbitral awards is a central concern in currentmultilateral efforts to reform investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). Asidefrom protecting the disputing parties from mistakes by tribunals (retrospectivecorrectness), corrective review also guides future interpreters not to repeatpast mistakes (prospective correctness). This article assesses how effectivethe three existing ISDS correction mechanisms – (1) review by annulmentcommittees or domestic courts, (2) review by the contracting parties, and (3)review by subsequent tribunals – are in promoting such prospective correctness.After assessing existing practice, the article finds that wrong decisions ‘don’tdie’. Annulled or set-aside awards continue to be cited, contracting states’authoritative interpretations are disregarded, and subsequent tribunals do notconverge around a jurisprudence constante. This failure of correctivemechanisms to achieve prospective correctness is due to lacking legalconstraints, incentives to use favorable awards even if they have beeninvalidated, and the simple difficulty in telling whether an award stillrepresents ‘correct’ law in ISDS. The article concludes by proposing possiblereforms to improve prospective correctness from the shepardization of awards,to rules on precedent, and broader institutional reform.

【关键词】 ISDS, correctness, investment law, international investmenttreaties, UNCITRAL reform, annulment

计算社会科学：障碍与机遇

【题目】Computational social science:Obstacles and opportunities

【引用】David M. J. Lazer, AlexPentland, Duncan J. Watts, Sinan Aral, Susan Athey, Noshir Contractor, DeenFreelon, Sandra Gonzalez-Bailon, Gary King, Helen Margetts, Alondra Nelson, MatthewJ. Salganik, Markus Strohmaier, Alessandro Vespignani, and Claudia Wagner.8/28/2020. “Computational socialscience: Obstacles and opportunities.” Science, 369, 6507, Pp.1060-1062. Publisher'sVersion Copy at https://j.mp/2YIuWdh

【摘要】

在过去的十年里，计算社会科学（computational social science, CSS）的领域在显著位置上爆炸式发展，使用了观测数据、实验设计和大规模模拟等曾经不可行或不可用的方法发表了数千篇论文。这些研究大大提高了我们对从社会不平等到传染病传播等重要现象的认识……但该领域在重要方面也存在不足。该领域的许多制度结构，包括研究伦理、教育学和数据基础设施，仍处于起步阶段。我们提出了解决这些问题的机会，特别是促进二十世纪大学联盟与CSS领域的智力需求之间的一致关系。

【原文】

The field of computational social science (CSS) has exploded inprominence over the past decade, with thousands of papers published usingobservational data, experimental designs, and large-scale simulations that wereonce unfeasible or unavailable to researchers. These studies have greatlyimproved our understanding of important phenomena, ranging from socialinequality to the spread of infectious diseases. The institutions supportingCSS in the academy have also grown substantially, as evidenced by theproliferation of conferences, workshops, and summer schools across the globe,across disciplines, and across sources of data. But the field has also fallenshort in important ways. Many institutional structures around thefield—including research ethics, pedagogy, and data infrastructure—are stillnascent. We suggest opportunities to address these issues, especially inimproving the alignment between the organization of the 20th-century universityand the intellectual requirements of the field.

如何衡量选区的紧凑性——一种实证计算方法

【题目】How to Measure LegislativeDistrict Compactness If You Only Know it When You See It

【引用】Aaron Kaufman, Gary King, andMayya Komisarchik. Forthcoming. “Howto Measure Legislative District Compactness If You Only Know it When You See It.”American Journal of Political Science. Publisher's Version Copyat https://j.mp/2Fs3ESc

【摘要】

为了防止不公正地改划选区，许多州的宪法要求立法区要“紧凑（compact）”。然而，虽然很难通过法律的字面意思了解其准确含义，但实际上意味着人们对这个概念的理解存在共识。与此相反，学术界已经表明，紧凑性有多个维度，并由此产生了许多相互冲突的解决办法。我们假设，虽然紧凑性是复杂和多维的，但人们对此存在共识，这两个条件都是正确的。我们开展了一项调查来验证这种理解具有很高的可靠性（在标准配对比较方法失败的数据中）。我们建立了一个统计模型，仅从地区的几何特征、法官和负责重新划分的公职人员的紧凑性评估等方面进行高精度预测。我们还提供了20160个州立法和国会选区的紧凑性数据，以及计算任一选区这一指标的开源软件。

【原文】

To deter gerrymandering, many state constitutions requirelegislative districts to be "compact." Yet, the law offers fewprecise definitions other than "you know it when you seeit," which effectively implies a common understanding of the concept.In contrast, academics have shown that compactness has multiple dimensions andhave generated many conflicting measures. We hypothesize that both are correct-- that compactness is complex and multidimensional, but a common understandingexists across people. We develop a survey to elicit this understanding, withhigh reliability (in data where the standard paired comparisons approachfails). We create a statistical model that predicts, with high accuracy, solelyfrom the geometric features of the district, compactness evaluations by judgesand public officials responsible for redistricting, among others. We also offercompactness data from our validated measure for 20,160 state legislative andcongressional districts, as well as open source software to computethis measure from any district.